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Middle knowledge:
The "foreknowledge defense"
DAVID PAUL HUNT
Department of Philosophy, Whittier College, Whittier, CA 90608

A recent article in this journal by Richard Otte, as well as brief passages in
a couple of books by Jonathan Kvanvig and William Lane Craig, have set
forth a distinctive strategy for defending middle knowledge from its critics. 1 The approach in question not only differs significantly from other
defenses of middle knowledge that have been put forward, but also
captures well one of the main reasons why middle knowledge has come to
possess whatever plausibility it now enjoys in philosophical circles. I
happen to think that this defense is not ultimately successful; but since it
does represent a central strand in the case for middle knowledge, its failure
is instructive in a way that makes it amply worth re-examining. In undertaking such a re-examination, I will focus my comments on the more
extensive discussion to be found in Otte's article.
The notion of middle knowledge, which seems to have made its first
appearance in the course of a 16th-century dispute between the Jesuits and
the Dominicans over the relationship between divine grace and human
freedom,2 has lately re-entered the arena of philosophical debate as a
result of its employment by Alvin Plantinga in his formulation of the "free
will defense" against the problem of evil. 3 The free will defense will be
sufficiently familiar to readers of this journal that it should be unnecessary
to recapitulate it here; but a brief summary of the way in which middle
knowledge figures in Plantinga's argument may still be in order.
Middle knowledge enters the account in the form of an epistemic
capacity purportedly exercised by God as He tries to decide what type of
world to create. Obviously the sort of information that would be most
valuable to God in this situation of cosmic deliberation is a knowledge of
how things would turn out under the various options open to Him. What
epistemic resources could God draw upon in order to gain possession of
such information? Clearly His exhaustive knowledge of pure possibilities,

which enables Him to calculate all the conceivable ways things could go
were He to actualize a given cosmic arrangement, is not going to do the
trick; for in the typical case this will tell Him only that things could go
exceedingly well and they could also go exceedingly poorly, which is
mighty thin stuff to stake a world on. What the quest for middle
knowledge hopes to turn up is some divine talent for selecting a unique
would out of the innumerable coulds. Is such a capacity intelligible?
Certainly it is, if we restrict the worlds in question to those in which
determinism is true; for then God can simply deduce the requisite information from His knowledge of the initial conditions needed to bring such a
world into existence together with the causal laws operating in that world.
But what about worlds like our own - worlds which contain free creatures
whose freedom is understood (as it is by most theists) in a manner incompatible with determinism?
For one of these libertarian worlds - the one that we know God ultimately decided to actualize - the complete history of events following
God's creative decree is accessible to Him through His foreknowledge.
But this will not take Him very far, for at least two reasons. In the first
place, it is doubtful that He could avail Himself of information based on
foreknowledge in the context of divine deliberation over which world to
actualize, a context which is logically prior to any created world being
actual, and thus foreknowable (it presumably being no easier for the
Divine Mind to deliberate over what It already knows It is going to do
than it is for human minds). In the second place, such information would
be inadequate in any case; for God's eventual decision to create the world
we know to be actual will fall short of the sagacity expected of the
Sul~reme Being unless He bases His decision on the judgment that this
world is better than (or at least not significantly exceeded by) the available
alternatives - unless, that is, He also knows how things would go under
the other choices available to Him, and the actual world compares
favorably with these.
Obviously He can know the history of these other (nonactual libertarian) worlds neither through foreknowledge, nor through a knowledge of
pure possibilities, nor through extrapolation from initial conditions and
causal laws. To know what would have happened if a different libertarian
scheme had been selected evidently requires some further epistemic
resource. This putative resource is what the Jesuit theologian Luis de
Molina, called "middle knowledge." It is so-called because it falls somewhere between a knowledge of what actually happens and a knowledge of

all the things that logically could happen. Specifically, it is a knowledge of
counterfactuals of freedom - propositions of the form, "If x were the case,
A would do y," where x is a counterfactual condition, A is a free agent, and
y is some action with respect to which A is significantly free.
For those of us who regard this supposed epistemic resource with
skepticism, there are at least a couple of ways to respond. One is to deny
that any propositions of the indicated form could possibly be true. The
other is to argue that, while there may indeed be true counterfactuals of
freedom, it is logically impossible for any of them to be objects of
knowledge. It is not easy to see how the latter argument would go, particularly in light of the fact that this stricture on knowledge would have to
apply to God as well as more limited beings. But the first approach is no
cakewalk either; in particular, it conflicts with the fact that counterfactuals
of freedom, such as If Tom had come to the party, Suzy would have left
and If the light had turned red, I would have stopped, are an integral part
of daily discourse, and thus would have to be assigned some other linguistic role if they are barred from ever expressing true propositions. Since
there do appear to be prima facie difficulties with each of these approaches, I am happy to assume (on behalf of the opponents of middle
knowledge) the burden of proof in this matter, while ceding to Otte the
enviable position of defender.
Before examining Otte's defensive strategy, however, something
should be said about what is really at stake in this conflict. From the role
that middle knowledge plays in Plantinga's version of the free will
defense, one could easily conclude that theists should be cheering on the
forces of middle knowledge. But this is far from being the case. Middle
knowledge, as Plantinga himself has recently noted,4 only makes things
more difficult for the theodicist. In general, the less God knows (middle or
otherwise), the less His goodness can be impugned by the existence and
amount of evil in the world; and if God's ignorance in this regard is
perfectly compatible with His omniscience (as it would be if there were no
true counterfactuals of freedom to be known), the orthodox theodicist
could secure all the advantages of Plantinga's free will defense without
implicating himself in Plantinga's notorious thesis of "transworld
depravity."
It is ironic, then, that the notion of middle knowledge, which was
reintroduced onto the philosophical stage in a role which turns out to be
inconsequential, has since found employment in other areas where it could
actually make a genuine contribution (assuming for the moment that the

notion itself is coherent). David Basinger, for example, has attempted to
illuminate the workings of divine providence and foreknowledge from a
middle-knowledge perspective, 5 while Del Ratzsch has recently developed
an account of causal laws based on counterfactuals of divine freedom. 6
Such efforts need to be acknowledged in determining what is at stake in
this controversy, though it is too early to say whether these applications
have the potential to outweigh the ill-effects of middle knowledge on
theodicy. All things considered, it appears that the overall coherence of
theism will not be altered dramatically by the success or failure of middle
knowledge, and that the conflict is therefore one in which theists (qua
theists, anyway) can afford to remain neutral.
As it happens, every attack on middle knowledge has taken the first of
the two approaches mentioned above: a denial that there are any true
counterfactuals of freedom. 7 Otte constructs his defense of middle
knowledge with particular attention to the earliest, and still the most
important, of these attacks, that of Robert Adams in his 1977 article
"Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil. ''8 Otte sums up the essence
of Adams' complaint against middle knowledge as follows: "The reason
Adams believes that conditionals of freedom are necessarily false is that
he cannot understand what it would be for them to be true. ''9 A similar
point could be made about another opponent of middle knowledge,
William Hasker, whose skeptical article on the subject focuses on the
question, "Who or what is it (if anything) that brings it about that these
propositions are true? ''1~ Indeed, the question of what it would be for
counterfactuals of freedom to be true - or, alternatively, what could bring
about, or cause, or ground their truth - seems to lie at the heart of the
debate over middle knowledge. Among defenders of middle knowledge
the tendency has been to dismiss such questions. Plantinga, for example,
has replied to Adams as follows: "It seems to me much clearer that some
counterfactuals of freedom are at least possibly true than that the truth of
propositions must, in general, be grounded in this way; ''11 and Basinger
has remarked laconically that "they simply are true. ''12 With one side
demanding a "ground" (as I will sum up the feature in question) 13 and the
other side flatly rejecting the demand, things seem to have reached an
impasse. The differences between the two parties are apparently so deeply
rooted that further discussion along these lines is unlikely to lead to any
progress.
What is distinctive about Otte's strategy is that it is based on a recognition of the utter futility of continuing to slog it out over the issue of

"grounding" while each side rejects the crucial intuitions of the other. In
the face of this apparent stalemate, Otte proposes a way of approaching
the issue indirectly. The idea, as I reconstruct it, is to find some other
genre of knowledge k such that k possesses the following two characteristics:
(1)
(2)

the epistemic acceptability of k - especially the truth of the "kstatements" which are the objects of k - is not in dispute; and
there is no relevant difference between k-statements and counterfactuals of freedom with respect to the quality of their
"grounding."

If some plausible candidate for k can be identified, then the argument
would proceed as follows. Adams et al. are claiming that counterfactuals
of freedom are insufficiently grounded to be true. If this is correct, then no
statement possessing the same quality of groundedness as counterfactuals
of freedom should be true. But k comprises true statements possessing the
same quality of groundedness as counterfactuals of freedom. Therefore we
must reject the claim that counterfactuals of freedom are insufficiently
grounded to be true.
In his article Otte selects divine foreknowledge as the substitutioninstance for k. 14 The relevant k-statements, then, would be propositions
about future free choices, or 'futurefactuals of freedom' (as I will term
them in contrast to counterfactuals of freedom). The first question to be
asked, then, is, How well does Otte's choice of foreknowledge really
satisfy (1)? The answer must be that it falls considerably short of expectations.
For a little perspective on this, compare Otte's strategy with the one
that guides God and Other Minds, 15 where Plantinga argues that, in virtue
of crucial similarities in our epistemic situation vis-d-vis belief in other
minds and belief in God, the rational acceptability of the former accrues to
the latter as well. There are obvious parallels here with Otte's argument, in
which middle knowledge, foreknowledge, and quality of groundedness
play the roles, respectively, of belief in God, belief in other minds, and
rational acceptability. Whatever the extent of these strategic parallels,
however, there is a crucial difference in execution: Plantinga's argument
really does satisfy its version of (1), since the acceptability of belief in
other minds is not genuinely in dispute. Foreknowledge, on the other hand,
is highly controversial (even among theists); moreover, such controversy
concerns not only the proper analysis of foreknowledge, but its very
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existence as well. The best that Otte can do with regard to (1) is to note
that foreknowledge is "a doctrine of traditional theism, which Adams does
not deny. ''16 But whether this is enough to satisfy (1) depends on how
stable one's commitment to foreknowledge proves to be in the course of
an argument designed to bring it into conflict with Adams' reasoned
rejection of middle knowledge. If foreknowledge and middle knowledge
really do belong in the same epistemic boat, as Otte maintains, then what
is to prevent Adams et al. from rejecting both together? Perhaps the
assumption that foreknowledge is "a doctrine of traditional theism" would
give such critics pause. Still, it is far less costly for a theist to respond to
Otte's argument with "so much the worse for foreknowledge" than it is for
the atheist in God and Other Minds to adopt a similar line regarding belief
in other minds. 17
In sum, since foreknowledge is far from the epistemic paragon called
for by (1), it cannot anchor its end of the comparison with middle
knowledge securely enough to force acceptance of the latter. The most that
Otte's argument can do, then, is convict of inconsistency those theists who
accept foreknowledge while rejecting middle knowledge. Perhaps Otte
would reply that this more modest objective is all he is aiming for - after
all, his argument is clearly ineffective for anyone who doubts the intelligibility of foreknowledge. But I deny that even this objective is within
his reach, since foreknowledge is even less suited to (2) than it is to (1).
Otte notes that Adams had given brief consideration to a couple of
proposals for what might ground the truth of counterfactuals of freedom.
These proposals are (i) that the antecedent of the counterfactual necessitates the consequent, and (ii) that the actual desires, intentions, and
character of the agent referred to in the consequent guarantee the truth of
the counterfactual. But Adams rejects both of these candidates on the basis
of their incompatibility with free agency: the first for obvious reasons, and
the second because even the condition of an agent's will cannot (in a
libertarian scheme, anyway) guarantee the performance of a particular free
action (the agent may, for example, act out of character). 18 Now Otte
shows that the same two proposals could be put forward as grounds for the
truth offuturefactuals of freedom, and that they encounter in this context
the same basic objection they ran up against in the case of counterfactuals
of freedom: they are incompatible with the assumed freedom of the agent.
A free agent's future behavior, no less than his counterfactual behavior,
must be free of necessitation by anything in the present, including facts
about the agent's will.
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This comparison of counterfactuals and futurefactuals with respect to
the two proposals for grounding canvassed in Adams' article constitutes
the heart of Otte's case for assigning middle knowledge and
foreknowledge to the same epistemic boat and concluding that the one is
acceptable just in case the other is. The elaboration of this case consists of
a reply to a skeptical rejoinder. Suppose the opponent of middle
knowledge who nevertheless accepts foreknowledge suggests the following ground for the latter: "propositions about future free choices are true
because what they claim will occur actually occurs. ''19 Unlike the two
candidates discussed by Adams, which seem to be equally applicable (or
inapplicable) to counterfactuals and futurefactuals, the present proposal
marks a distinctive feature of futurefactuals alone, since "The states of
affairs that make a proposition about a future free choice true will be
actual at some time, whereas the states of affairs that a conditional of
freedom is based on may never be actual. ''2~ Otte's response to this line is
simply that the difference cited is ultimately trivial (perhaps even irrelevant altogether) when it is the grounding of these statements that is at
issue; as he puts it, the claim that "propositions about future free choices
are true because they correspond to what will happen, or what will be
actual at a certain time ... does not appear to be significantly different
from saying that conditionals of freedom are true because they correspond
to what would happen, or what wouM be actual in certain situations. ''21
This is a surprising statement, at first blush, given the obvious and
significant differences between will and would, not the least of which is
the difference cited by Otte himself: the fact that will, but not wouM, is
wedded indissolubly to the actual world. After all, isn't motedness in the
actual world precisely the sort of quality that ought to make a crucial
difference to grounding? What apparantly leads Otte to discount its
significance, however, is the belief that it masks a more fundamental
similarity between the two cases, a similarity which he explains as
follows: "Both are true in virtue of corresponding to some state of affairs
that is neither actual nor is necessitated in any way by what is actual. ''22
This answer requires a little unpacking. He surely cannot mean, in
claiming that both are true in virtue of corresponding to some state of
affairs that is not actual, that they thereby correspond to some nonactual
state of affairs; for futurefactuals are true in virtue of corresponding to an
actual state of affairs, albeit one that lies in the future (naturally). To rule
out this unwanted difference between the two cases, the first and third 'is'
in the last statement of the preceding paragraph must be taken as tensed,

with the copula specifically indicating a state of affairs that is (present
tense) not actual now. Such a construal, however, would exclude the past
as well as the future, thus omitting an additional source of similarity
between counterfactuals and futurefactuals of freedom; for it is also the
case that both are true in virtue of corresponding to some state of affairs
that neither was actual nor is necessitated by what was actual. This
suggests that his point should be rephrased as follows:

(3) Neither counterfactuals of freedom nor futurefactuals of freedom
are entailed by any state of affairs that has already (past or
present) been actualized.
This appears to be the basis upon which he rests his conclusion that "it
would seem to be no easier to account for true propositions about future
free actions than it is to account for true conditionals of freedom ...
Neither is more problematic than the other. ''23
It's hard to know what to make of this argument. In the first place, it
seems to assume a fairly narrow view of what can render a statement
problematic. On what basis could (3), which addresses only one possible
source of alethic difficulty, be used to underwrite the conclusion that
counterfactuals of freedom have no problems with grounding not shared
by futurefactuals of freedom? In other words, what reason do we have for
accepting (3) as sufficient to satisfy the requirements of (2)? The fact is
that no such reason has been given, nor is it easy to see what such a reason
could possibly be.
In the second place, this argument assumes that the difference between
counterfactuals and futurefactuals of freedom with respect to the actual
future can be overlooked in light of their similarity with respect to the
actual past and present. But this assumption obviously requires some
justification. If it is generally true that a difference in one tense is insufficient to derail an argument based on a similarity in the remaining two
tenses (an absurd notion on its face), then the following argument should
also be valid. Let us define a 'pastfactual of freedom' as a statement about
a past free choice. Such pastfactuals, however, are similar to counterfactuals in that both are true in virtue of corresponding to some state of affairs
that is neither present nor future. Therefore (and without further ado),
"neither is more problematic than the other." But of course this conclusion
is ridiculous: if a pastfactual like "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" is just as
problematic as a counterfactual like "If Pompey had extended an olive
branch, Caesar would have remained in Gaul" (let alone Quine's "If

Caesar had commanded the UN forces in Korea, he would have used the
atom bomb"), then the whole notion of one statement being more
problematic than another has been gutted of all content. 24
It would seem, then, that the justification for Otte's discounting of
future differences in grounding must have something to do with the
specific character of the future itself. It is worth quoting in this connection
the entire passage in which Otte addresses and dismisses his opponent's
insistence that correspondence with the actual future puts the grounding of
futurefactuals on a different footing from that of counterfactuals:
One might respond to my argument by pointing out that there are
differences between conditionals of freedom and propositions about
future free choices. For example, we can eventually determine if a
proposition about a future free choice is true, but we are never able to
determine if a conditional of freedom is true. The states of affairs that
make a proposition about a future free choice true will be actual at
some time, whereas the states of affairs that a conditional of freedom is
based on may never be actual. However, this does not imply that what
makes a proposition about a future free choice true is any better
understood than what makes a conditional of freedom true. Propositions
about future free choices are true n o w , which is before we can determine which ones are true, or before the states of affairs that "ground"
their truth are actual. 25
Otte appears to be arguing in this passage that the actual future (unlike the
actual past and present) suffers from a lack of determinateness, and that
this lack is sufficiently serious to reduce the viability of the future as a
source of grounding to the same level as a merely possible (i.e., nonactual)
state of affairs. If successful, this argument would support
(4)

Both counterfactuals of freedom and futurefactuals of freedom are
true at a [world, time] at which whatever grounds their truth is
indeterminate

as a candidate for satisfying the requirements of (2). Indeterminateness,
however, can be understood in either an epistemological or an ontological
sense. Otte runs the two senses together in this passage; but if we are to
evaluate the justice of this charge against the future, we will need to
disentangle them.
The epistemological version of Otte's argument, when extracted from
the above passage, goes as follows:
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(5)

(6)
(7)

"We can eventually determine if a proposition about a future free
choice is true, but we are never able to determine if a conditional
of freedom is true."
But: "Propositions about future free choices are true now, which is
before we can determine which ones are true."
Therefore: The difference between counterfactuals and futurefactuals cited in (5) "does not imply that what makes a proposition
about a future free choice true is any better understood than what
makes a conditional of freedom true."

Unfortunately, this version of the argument, at least, is an unqualified
failure.
In the first place, no argument based (as this one is) on the epistemic
indeterminateness of the future will succeed in engaging the enemies of
middle knowledge. Their acceptance of foreknowledge (if they do accept
it) is not premised on our ability to know which futurefactuals of freedom
are true; it is premised on such futurefactuals being true (or false) whether
we know it or not. Likewise their rejection of middle knowledge is not
based on our failure to determine which counterfactuals of freedom are
true; it is based on such counterfactuals' failure to be true. Adams'
complaint concerned what (ontologicaUy) grounds or makes counterfactuals true, not whether we can (epistemically) determine them to be true.
Outside the circle of anti-realists, at least, such matters are thought to be
quite distinct.
In the second place, the argument is invalid regardless of its intended
audience. One conclusion that does follow from (5) and (6) is

(8) The inability of human beings at time t to determine which
counterfactuals of freedom are true does not (by itself) prevent
such counterfactuals from being true at t.
But as we noted in the preceding paragraph, no opponent of middle
knowledge ever took the position being disputed in (8). This is presumably
why (8) is not employed as the conclusion of the argument; but (7), the
conclusion that is actually used, simply does not follow from the purely
epistemic premises of that argument. Consider the following variation on

(5)-(7):
(5") We can eventually determine if a proposition about the planets of
Sirius is true, but we are never able to determine if a conditional
of freedom is true.

11
(6') But: Propositions about the planets of Sirius are true now, which is
before we can determine which ones are true.
(7') Therefore: The difference between counterfactuals and propositions about the planets of Sirius cited in (5') does not imply that
what makes a proposition about the planets of Sirius true is any
better understood than what makes a conditional of freedom true.
But while (5') and (6') are true, (7") is false. It is not necessary to determine whether it is true that the Sirian system contains a planet larger than
Jupiter in order to understand what it is for this proposition to be true.
In the third place, notice that Otte's epistemological argument refers
only to the capacities that we possess: we cannot know which futurefactuals of freedom are true, therefore we are in the same epistemic position
regarding both counterfactuals and futurefactuals. But the real issue
concerns the epistemic position of God, and it is unclear just what is
supposed to follow for the Supreme Being from the fact that human beings
lack both these epistemic capacities. Is there anything about our own lack
of epistemic access to counterfactuals and futurefactuals of freedom to
suggest that they must come as a "package deal" (both or neither) for all
potential knowers?
Insofar as Otte hints at any justification for such a generalization, it
seems to be the following. Though many of the limitations upon human
knowledge are ones that we can easily conceive a Supreme Being
transcending, this is not so clearly the case when it comes to the strictures
on human foreknowledge and middle knowledge; for the latter are a
product of the situation adumbrated in (4), which not only denies possession of foreknowledge and middle knowledge to human beings, but also
makes it exceedingly obscure how any being could have such knowledge.
The orthodox conception of God, however, assures us of the reality of
divine foreknowledge. God must, then, know futurefactuals of freedom in
some basic or logically primitive way that we are unable to grasp. 26 But if
divine foreknowledge is acceptable in spite of its apparent flouting of (4),
we have no grounds for denying a similar indulgence to divine middle
knowledge as well. If it is possible for God to just know futurefactuals of
freedom, and that's all there is to it, there is no apparent reason why He
couldn't just know counterfactuals of freedom as well.
If this is how the "package" is tied together, it is a pretty flimsy affair.
The fact remains that foreknowledge and middle knowledge are
distinctively different species of (putative) knowledge. 27 The claim that
their fates are nevertheless intertwined, so that the one is rationally
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acceptable only if the other is also, has been made to depend upon the
view that the epistemic grounding of each is equally ungraspable. The
latter, in turn, is supposed to follow from (4). But (4) is a generalization
based on evidence of human incapacities; why it should apply to God has
not been explained. Indeed, the suggestion that foreknowledge belongs on
the same epistemically basic level as middle knowledge is especially
strange in light of the many accounts that have been offered of how
foreknowledge might work. For example, one traditional conception of
God places Him outside of time, so that every temporal event is present to
Him, rather than being separated from Him by some temporal interval, z8
As another example, relativity theory has opened up intriguing
possibilities for how peculiar properties of space and time, or peculiar
particles like tachyons, could enable information from the future to reach
the present. 29 For many defenders of foreknowledge, the view that God
just knows the future, without the merest hint of an explanation of how this
remarkable talent might operate, would be the position of last resort, if not
tantamount to an admission of defeat. Even if there are problems (and
there surely are) with most of the accounts that have been offered - e.g.,
with the intelligibility of an atemporal deity, or the paradoxical consequences of retrocausation - such problems, and the chances of solving
them satisfactorily, do not at all appear to be in the same epistemic boat as
the success or failure of middle knowledge.
Both the scenarios mentioned above (a timeless God and exotic
relativity-effects) would allow foreknowledge; neither would render
middle knowledge possible if it was not possible on other grounds. Before
concluding that the "package deal" has fallen irretrievably apart, however,
let us consider one attempt at reconstituting it. Suppose it is claimed that
scenarios analogous to those that were sketched on behalf of
foreknowledge could also be constructed on behalf of middle knowledge.
For a God who surveys all of history from outside of time, the analogue
would be a deity who is not confined to the actual world, but occupies a
"transcosmic" vantage point from which He can inspect all possible
worlds while belonging to none. For space-time loops and relativistic
particles, the analogue would be the possibility of communicating with
alternative possible worlds, perhaps in something like the manner depicted
in the story "All the Myriad Ways" by Larry Niven (cited by David Lewis
as an illustration of modal realism). 30 But whatever the merits of these
scenarios (and they strike me as much more clearly incoherent than their
twins introduced in the preceding paragraph), they would do nothing to
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bring middle knowledge back into the same epistemic package with
foreknowledge.
Take the first suggestion of a transcosmic God. If we assume modal
realism, then a world can be considered actual only from the perspective
of that same world; from a transcosmic perspective, on the other hand, all
worlds (or none?) would be actual, and no counterfactuals at all would be
true (since the truth-conditions for counterfactuals make essential
reference to a unique actual world). If modal realism is instead denied, the
actual world would presumably be identifiable from a transcosmic
standpoint by its concreteness, in contrast to the abstractness of the other
possible worlds. But which of the latter would be the world that would
have been actual if the antecedent of some counterfactual of freedom had
obtained? Would it display a ghostly semi-reality, intermediate between
the concrete and the abstract? (Does middle knowledge require some sort
of middle being to ground it?) No such questions arise regarding the
relevance of divine atemporality to foreknowledge, since the world whose
future grounds the truth of futurefactuals of freedom is readily identifiable
from an atemporal perspective as the only world that is actual. The same
point can be made about the second scenario as well. Even if we could
receive messages from other possible worlds, and we succeeded in
identifying the possible world from which a particular transcosmic
message issued, we would be no closer to answering the question upon
which middle knowledge depends: Is that world, or is it not, the one that
would have been actual if such-and-such conditions had obtained?
The epistemological argument, then, fails to associate middle
knowledge with foreknowledge in any sense that would require us to
accept the former if we accept the latter. But perhaps Otte's non-epistemological argument will fare better. It looks like this:
(9)

"The states of affairs that make a proposition about a future free
choice true will be actual at some time, whereas the states of
affairs that a conditional of freedom is based on may never be
actual."
(10) But: "Propositions about future free choices are true now, which is
... before the states of affairs that 'ground' their truth are actual."
(11) Therefore: The difference between counterfactuals and futurefactuals cited in (9) "does not imply that what makes a propositition
about a future free choice true is any better understood than what
makes a conditional of freedom true."
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One virtue of this version is that its premises advert to the sort of facts
that seem relevant to the grounding of counterfactuals and futurefactuals,
not merely to human epistemic capacities.
Nevertheless, this argument is no more persuasive than the first one.
The principal reason is that foreknowledge is grounded in something that
actually happens, and it is the occurrence of that future event that sanctions the foreknowledge of it. In contrast, whatever grounds the truth of
counterfactuals of freedom is something other than an actually occurrent
event. 31 The indeterminateness of those states of affairs in virtue of which
counterfactuals of freedom are true is therefore of a wholly different order
from the indeterminateness of those states of affairs in virtue of which
futurefactuals of freedom are true. Though the latter are not yet determinate, they nevertheless will be. Yet according to Otte, this is to count for
no more than if they were never determinate at all. This is a position that
needs a good deal more justification than has been forthcoming if it is to
be considered at all credible.
In the second place, if the fact that future events are included in the
actual world is of so little import that they are considered no better
grounded than nonactual possibilities, it makes it correspondingly easier
for the orthodox theist to escape Otte's dilemma altogether by abandoning
foreknowledge. Some philosophers have understood the indeterminateness
of the future to entail that statements about future contingencies are
neither true nor false. Otte evidently does not accept this entailment, since
he holds that such statements are true now. But he does not say why he
rejects it. In the absence of any good reason against it, the theist who
grants Otte's claim regarding the indeterminateness of the future would
seem well within his rights in concluding that futurefactuals of freedom
are neither true nor false, and that foreknowledge is therefore not a
consequence of the traditional doctrine of divine omniscience after all. If
Otte is also correct in linking the epistemic fate of futurefactuals with that
of counterfactuals, then the proper conclusion to draw is that God is not in
a position to know either of them.
In the third place, what actually follows from the argument is
(12) The nonactuality at t of those states of affairs that ground counterfactuals of freedom does not (by itself) prevent such counterfactuals from being true at t.
But like (8), the conclusion that actually follows from Otte's epistemologica1 argument, (12) is nothing that the opponents of middle knowledge
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have ever been concerned to challenge. 32 By suggesting that the most
serious threat to middle knowledge is its failure to be grounded appropriately in the actual world, Otte sets up a straw man that diverts our
attention from the real malady with which middle knowledge is afflicted.
In order to implement the strategy adumbrated in (1) and (2), Otte must
(among other things) come up with a characterization of the quality of
groundedness possessed by futurefactuals of freedom. Given the comparison he ultimately wishes to make with counterfactuals of freedom, he
draws particular attention to the way in which futurefactuals of freedom
are ungrounded in any actual states of affairs - or, more perspicuously, the
way in which such futurefactuals are true at (earlier) times at which the
states of affairs which ground them are not (yet) actual. Since this is still
not precisely the situation that obtains with counterfactuals, whose
grounding may never be actual, Otte must show that this minor difference
between the two cases does not justify the assignment of a different value
to their qualities of groundedness. He accomplishes this, not so much by
closely comparing the two cases and concluding that their grounding is
similarly structured (i.e., in the way that Plantinga does for the theological
and analogical' arguments in God and Other Minds), as by insisting that
the two cases and concluding that their grounding is similarly as by
insisting that what they have in common - the fact that the truth of such
propositions does not depend on the present (or past) actuality of those
states of affairs that ground them - renders them equally mysterious. So
Otte concludes, "Although there are important differences between
conditionals of freedom and propositions about future free choices, there
is no reason to think that we have a better understanding of what it is for
propositions about future free choices to be true than we do of what it is
for conditionals of freedom to be t i t l e . ''33
This assessment of futurefactuals of freedom, it should be noted, is
exceedingly dubious. The fact that those states of affairs that make a
proposition about a future free choice true are not now actual but nevertheless will be actual, far from rendering such propositions mysterious, is
precisely what constitutes their truth. Certainly there is no mystery now
about what grounds the truth of some pundit' s remark on March 15, 1988,
that Michael Dukakis will be the Democratic nominee for President. It is
Dukakis's subsequent status as the nominee that made it true then (before
the states of affairs that grounded it were actual) that he would be the
nominee. Likewise, if the statement that Jesse Jackson will be the nominee
in 1992 is true now, it is because his being the nominee will be actual in
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1992. Though Otte treats such cases as mysterious, it is unclear just what
the mystery is supposed to be.
Counterfactuals of freedom, unlike futurefactuals, may indeed be
mysterious; as a skeptic regarding middle knowledge, I happen to believe
that they are. Otte grants their mysteriousness, but for a very different
reason: it is so he can then point out (incorrectly) that futurefactuals of
freedom share this same mysteriousness, and conclude that anyone who
accepts foreknowledge while demanding an account of middle knowledge
is being unreasonable. But Otte has traced the mysteriousness of counterfactuals of freedom to the wrong source. Whether a statement requires
contemporaneous (or any) grounding in the actual world depends on the
kind of statement that it is. If a statement is not of a kind that requires such
grounding, it is unclear why its lack should be mysterious. It is not as
though actual (contemporaneous) grounding is the only sort available;
pastfactuals, like futurefactuals of freedom, have a noncontemporaneous
grounding; statements of pure possibility, like counterfactuals of freedom,
have a nonactual grounding. 34
Now the difference in grounding cited in (9) is a difference with respect
to a standard forfuturefactuals. (11) is quite correct, then, in pointing out
that the failure of counterfactuals to satisfy this standard is not an adequate
basis for impugning their intelligibility. But the reason the difference
between counterfactuals and futurefactuals cited in (9) "does not imply
that what makes a proposition about a future free choice true is any better
understood than what makes a conditional of freedom true" is not because
of something more fundamental that they share (a certain quality of
groundedness based on (3), (4), or simply the sheer mysteriousness of
their truth); rather, it is because of something they do not share: a single
standard of grounding. The argument contained in (9)-(11) is therefore
irrelevant to the project of throwing foreknowledge and middle knowledge
into the same epistemic boat in such a way that some of the "good name"
of the former (such as it is) might rub off on the latter. If counterfactuals
of freedom are problematic, it must be in relation to their own standard of
grounding, not that of some other variety of proposition. But we never get
a glimpse of that standard in Otte's article; indeed, it is a significant
feature of his argument that the nature of counterfactuals remains largely a
cipher. It is not surprising, then, that the case against middle knowledge is
transformed in Otte's hands into the divorce of counterfactuals of freedom
from the actual world, a case quite different from the one that the main
opponents of middle knowledge would themselves wish to make.
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Let us retum, then, to Adams' original complaint about the grounding
of counterfactuals of freedom. It isn't that counterfactuals of freedom lack
any grounding in what has already occurred or what is presently determinate (a position that would involve Adams in inconsistency if he also
endorsed foreknowledge). It isn't even that counterfactuals of freedom
may lack any grounding whatsoever in the actual world. Rather, the
problem with counterfactuals of freedOm is that there appears to be a
contradiction at their very heart. Skepticism regarding the possibility of
middle knowledge arises primarily from the fact that the force of the
'would' connecting antecedent and consequent seems incompatible with
the status of counterfactuals of freedom as propositions about the free
actions of free agents. When Adams conjures up his two candidates for the
role of what makes counterfactuals of freedom true, he selects them for the
express purpose of having something to validate the 'would' that is such a
characteristic feature of these expressions. It is only after these two
candidates are in place that he evaluates them according to the second
criterion: their compatibility with the assumed freedom of the agent.
Adams' rejection of both candidates is a direct consequence of the
antagonism between these two criteria.
Before spelling out the precise nature of the incoherence Adams claims
to discover at the heart of counterfactuals of freedom, it is worth considering why Otte never addresses this question himself in the course of a
defense of middle knowledge geared specifically to Adams' attack. I think
the reason for this omission is that Adams' specific complaint against
counterfactuals of freedom is part of what makes up the ongoing stalemate
between the opposing forces, and Otte has designed his strategy precisely
in order to find a way around this deadlock, not to add one more layer of
forces to the current standoff. Unfortunately, it is harder to avoid the battle
of entrenched intuitions that separates the two sides than Otte may have
imagined. His strategy of comparing counterfactuals and futurefactuals of
freedom inevitably relies upon a particular way of tmderstanding the logic
of counterfactuals. Adams' rejection of middle knowledge also depends
upon a particular way of reading counterfactuals. But these two readings
happen to conflict. Otte's strategy, then, far from avoiding those substantive issues over which the opposing forces have reached an impasse,
actually presupposes a particular position on one of those contested issues.
Let us see how this happens.
Otte wants to show that counterfactuals and futurefactuals of freedom
are alethically similar, so that anyone who accepts the possibility of true
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futurefactuals of freedom is rationally compelled to accept the possibility
of true counterfactuals of freedom. Now the modal picture presupposed by
the futurefactual of freedom A will do y is one in which (i) there is a
plurality of possible worlds sharing their past history with the actual world
but diverging from each other into the future, (ii) in at least one of these
worlds A does y, (iii) in at least one of these worlds A does not do y, and
(iv) a privileged status (i.e., actuality) is claimed on behalf of one of the
worlds in which A does y. The central move in Otte's argument, however
that "an account of what it is for propositions about future choices to be
true is very similar to an account of what it is for conditionals of freedom
to be true ''35 -, has no hope of acceptance unless the modal picture
presupposed by counterfactuals of freedom is the spitting image of the one
just sketched for futurefactuals. That is, Otte's whole strategy is built on
the assumption that the counterfactual of freedom If x were the case, A
would do y is such that (i') there is a plurality of possible worlds sharing
their past
history
with
the-actual-world-minimally-modified-toaccommodate-x but diverging from each other into the future, (ii') in at
least one of these worlds A does y, (iii') in at least one of these worlds A
does not do y, and (iv') a privileged status (i.e., "counterfactuality," or the
way things would be i f . . . ) is claimed on behalf of one of the worlds in
which A does y. In other words, just as there is a particular way things will
turn out under actual conditions (without this closing off the alternatives
required by free agency), so there is also a particular way things will turn
out under specified counterfactual conditions (without this closing off the
alternatives required by free agency either).
At the beginning of this essay I claimed that Otte's article, while novel
in the strategy it pursues, also casts into sharper relief one of the main
reasons why middle knowledge has appeared plausible to its various
supporters all along. What I had in mind when I made that claim is Otte's
assumption, adumbrated in the previous paragraph, that counterfactualS of
freedom (with the exception of their characteristic counterfactual shift)
share exactly the s~rne modal structure as futurefactuals of freedom.
Plantinga makes this assumption as well:
-

suppose we think about a state of affairs that includes Curley's having
been offered $20,000, all relevant conditions - Curley's financial
situation, his general acquisitive tendencies, his venality - being the
same as in fact, in the actual world. Our question is really whether there
is something Curley would have done had this state of affairs been
actual ...
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The answer, I should think, is obvious and affirmative. There is
something Curley would have done, had that state of affairs obtained ...
[As to w h a t he would have done,] we may not know what that answer
is; but we should reject out of hand, I should think, the suggestion that
there simply is none. 36
A detailed critique of Plantinga's own defense of middle knowledge is
obviously outside the scope of this paper; but notice that his positive
grounds for accepting counterfactuals of freedom, as expressed in the
above passage, rest squarely on the same assumption as that of Otte: that
just as there is a particular way things will turn out under actual conditions, so there is also a particular way things will turn out under specified
counterfactual conditions. It is this assumption, I believe, that is primarily
responsible for encouraging the partisans of middle knowledge in the
notion that there is no more problem with counterfactuals of freedom than
there is with futurefactuals (or other indicatives) of freedom.
This is a highly controversial assumption; moreover, it is an assumption
that is rejected by the opponents of middle knowledge, for whom the
apparent similarity between counterfactuals and futurefactuals of freedom
(and between subjunctives and indicatives generally) is an illusion. The
reason they take this position is that a would seems to imply a certain
necessity (which is what prompts David Lewis to include the necessityoperator as part of his symbolization for counterfactual conditionals). If it
is true that, under given conditions (whether actual or counterfactual), A
might do y and A might not do y, then one cannot also say that under those
conditions A would do y. Yet the assumption that A is free with respect to
y entails (on the libertarian conception of freedom shared by all other
participants in the middle-knowledge debate and not disputed by Otte)
that, under given conditions, A might do y and A might not do y. Therefore, if A is free with respect to y, it cannot be true to say that A w o u l d do
y. This, in short, is the basis for Adams' claim that all counterfactuals of
freedom are necessarily false.
But one can say, under those same conditions, that A will do y. Thus the
genuine crux in counterfactuals of freedom, as opposed to the pseudocruces discussed by Otte, cannot be used to book passage for middle
knowledge on the same epistemic boat as foreknowledge. The difference
in futurefactuals that renders them compatible with free agency is that
their truth is grounded in the actualization of one particular pathway
through the branching pattems of future possibilities compatible with the
actual past and present. Since they entail only that A do y in one of the
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relevant worlds (namely, that one whose future turns out to be actual),
they leave open plenty of other relevantly similar worlds in which A may
refrain from y, as the conditions for free agency require.
Counterfactuals of freedom, on the other hand, cannot be grounded in
the actualization of one pathway out of a plurality of possibilities. (That is
the real significance of their disjunction from the actual world, of which
Otte makes so much). How, then, are they grounded? In the semantics for
counterfactuals developed by Lewis, this ground involves a kind of
monopoly exercised by counterfactuals over all the relevant possible
worlds: the claim that A would do y if antecedent condition x were to
obtain entails that A do y in all the relevantly similar x-worlds, leaving
none available for A's pursuit of other options. Assuming that this reading
of counterfactuals is correct, there appears to be an insuperable obstacle to
any consequent of a true counterfactual conditional giving expression to a
free action. But if this reading of counterfactuals is somehow mistaken,
Otte needs to show why; the issue cannot be avoided through a strategy of
"neutrally" comparing middle knowledge with foreknowledge, since this
strategy itself rests upon a particular reading of counterfactuals, and thus
assumes the very point at issue. 37, 38
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Regarding the question of whether the cause of middle knowledge might be
advanced through a revised reading of counterfactuals, the most obvious
course would be to adopt the "uniqueness assumption" involved in Robert
Stalnaker's semantics for counterfactual conditionals, according to which the
relevantly similar worlds that are appealed to in the analysis of counterfactuals are to be restricted to that unique world which is "closest" (or most
similar) to the actual world. One question is whether this uniqueness assumption is compatible with the possible-worlds implications of libertarian
freedom. Another question is whether the uniqueness assumption is a
plausible assumption to make in its own right, regardless of its implications
for free agency. David Lewis offers his own reasons for rejecting the uniqueness assumption in w ch. 3, of Counterfactuals (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1973), while Stalnaker himself, on page 134 of Inquiry
(Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books, The MIT Press, 1984), admits that the
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be much use in the defense of real-life counterfactuals of freedom, regardless
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